





This implies that the human factor and security culture as defined by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Nuclear Security Series No. 7, 
plays a crucial role in the entire nuclear security architecture of any organisation or 
state. Physical Protection Systems for nuclear facilities and radiological sources are 
designed to protect and/or prevent possible malicious acts.  
The dynamic significant threat environment has evolved such that, relying on 
the perception that certain nuclear materials are self-protecting, can lead to the 
sabotage and unauthorized removal of facility assets by insiders. These assets are 
manned by management members and employees who are trained and trusted to 
maintain procedures and practices required for the routine operation and develop-
ment of the associated facilities and activities. 
The methodological approach utilized in this research as a predictive potential 
insider model adapts initial data from the threat group table of the hypothetical fa-
cility, Anshar Radiation Source Calibration Laboratory and National Repository 
(RSCL). 
The initial state vector values adapted from the threat group table with a high, 
medium and low potential insider attribute analysis are; 0.42% 0.33% and 0.25% 
respectively of the employee population at RSCL. 
This methodology is designed to quantify the likely outcome of an imple-
mented internationally recommended security culture model to guide management 
of nuclear and radiological facilities in preventing sabotage and theft at nuclear and 
radiological facilities. 
Over a 20 year period (ie. trials), involving an annual International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) recommended self-assessment of the facility security cul-
ture, a steady state of 0.38%, 0.35% and 0.27% of the employee population indi-
cating a fairly balanced security system. 
The obtained steady state will aid the managers of RSCL to acknowledge and 
make the necessary changes to the knowledge training development of personnel, 
the controlled authorized access granted to the employees at various divisions of 
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The number of radioactive materials used in the radiological facilities around 
the world demands for an effective security to be put in place.  Ensuring the safe 
operation of facilities that uses radioactive materials has always been priority of 






radiation installations against growing terrorist threats and possible theft.  Physical 
protection systems, fire safety, radioactive security, accounting and control of radi-
oactive materials are practiced at radiological facilities to prevent any unauthorized 
actions from an outsider or even a worker of such facility. A Physical Protection 
System (PPS) is usually designed and implemented into these facilities to protect 
radioactive materials from adversaries which pose as possible threats. The purpose 
of the work is to articulate security requirements for handling radioactive materials 
at a radiological facility. 
The evaluation of physical protection system designed for a hypothetical radi-
ological facility against unauthorized actions is presented. In this research an Ad-
versary Sequence Diagram (ASD) is developed and effective of physical protection 
system is assessed through the use Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption 
(EASI model) for interruption of adversary action on a radiological facility. The 
estimated value of total probability of interruption P I is calculated using the rela-
tion:  
 
 is the combined non-detection probability which describes the probability that 
adversaries will not be defeated. 
The resulting probability of interruption associated with the facility according 
to the selected path of the adversary is 0.486. After the improvement in some secu-
rity measures put in place at the oncological center and running then model again, 
the probability of interruption for the facility increased to 0.565. The probability of 
interrupting the activities of an adversary abruptly towards the hypothetical 
radiological facility was increase by 7.9% indicating that the PPS provided for the  
hypothetical radiological facility has been improved in terms of reliability.  It may 
be a valuable guiding principle for decision-makers when establishing adequate se-
curity requirements for handling radioactive materials for a radiological center. 
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В настоящее время значительно увеличилось количество выводов из 
эксплуатации уран-графитовых ядерных реакторов. Важным аспектом явля-
ется определение радионуклидов для создания эффективной защиты при за-
